Attachment 2: TRCA Flood Infrastructure Location Detail and Deficiency List

Table 1

Dams							
Dame Name	Dam Height (m)	Region/Municipality	Second Tier Municipality	Hazard Potential Classification*	Date Constructed	Known Deficiencies	
G. Ross Lord Dam	19.3	Toronto	N/A	Very High	1972	 Dam Safety Review due in 2024. Dam foundation drainage system investigation and maintenance. 	
Claireville Dam	15.0	Toronto/Peel	Brampton	Very High	1963	 Spillway capacity is too small, and the dam is at risk of overtopping during extreme events. Right bank wing wall has settled and needs replacement. Gates and hoisting systems require major maintenance. Spillway stilling basin is too short for extreme events. 	
Stouffville Dam	7.6	York	Whitchurch- Stouffville	Very High	1969	 Emergency spillway requires erosion protection. Earthen embankment does not meet factor of safety requirements. 	
Milne Dam	9.3	York	Markham	Very High	1969	 Spillway capacity is too small, and the dam is at risk of overtopping during extreme events. Spillway does not meet loading requirements and is at risk of sliding during extreme events. Spillway stilling basin is too short for extreme events. 	
Palgrave Dam	4.3	Peel	Caledon	Very High	1860	 Spillway capacity is too small, and the dam is at risk of overtopping during extreme events. Dam requires upgrades to the stop log lifting system. Earthen embankment does not meet factor of safety requirements. 	
Black Creek Dam	7.3	Toronto	N/A	Moderate	1959	Flow control structure is susceptible to debris blockages and requires reconfiguration	
Secord Dam	5.0	Durham	Uxbridge	Low	1930	Earthen embankment is in very poor condition. Dam is at risk of failing.	
Osler Dam	5.0	Durham	Uxbridge	Low (Assumed)	1937	Concrete flow control structure is failing. Dam is at risk of failing.	
Glen Haffy Dam West	5.5	Peel	Caledon	Low	1950's	Dam has separated discharge pipe.	
Glen Haffy Dam East	5.5	Peel	Caledon	Low	1950's	Requires vegetation removal from embankment.	
Glen Haffy Extension Upper Dam	5.0	Peel	Caledon	Low	1950's	Spillway pipe failing Embankment unstable Dam is at risk of failing	
Glen Haffy Extension Lower Dam	5.0	Peel	Caledon	Low	1950's	Embankment unstable Dam is at risk of failing	

^{*}See Table 4 below for criteria used to determine Hazard Potential Classification for dams

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Table 2

Flood Control Channels						
Channel Name	Channel Length(m)	Region/Municipality	Second Tier Municipality	Date Constructed	Known Deficiencies	
Yonge/York Mills Channel	530m	Toronto	Toronto	1959	Gabion lining has deteriorated.	
Woodbridge Channel	1850m	York	Vaughan	1962	Two grade-control baffle chute structures are public safety issues and should be removed.	
Stouffville Channel	370m	York	Whitchurch- Stouffville	1980	 Gabion baskets are deteriorated and causing channel walls to fail. Sediment in channel requires removal. 	
Black Creek Channel	2370m	Toronto	Toronto	1969	Many concrete panels have cracked and settled.	
Scarlett Channel	3600m	Toronto	Toronto	1959	Many concrete panels have cracked and settled.	
Brampton Channel	570m	Peel	Brampton	1951	Channel outfall is a public safety hazard.	
Sheppard Channel	350m	Toronto	Toronto	1960's	Many concrete panels have cracked and settled. Low flow channel is failing	
Mimico Malton Channel	650m	Peel	Mississauga	1969	Requires maintenance dredging and clearing	
Oak Ridges Channel	90m	York	King	1981	Requires maintenance dredging and clearing	

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Table 3

Dikes						
Dike Name	Dike Length(m)	Region/Municipality	Second Tier Municipality	Date Constructed	Known Deficiencies	
Pickering Dike	1250m	Durham Region	Pickering	1983	Dike does not meet current engineering requirements for stability	
Ajax Dike	350m	Durham Region	Ajax	1983	Dike does not meet current engineering requirements for stability	
Bolton Dike	800m	Peel Region	Caledon	1983	None	
Etobicoke Dike	460m	Peel Region	Brampton	1969	Dike has small erosion scar that needs to be repaired	
West Don Flood Protection Landform	710m	City of Toronto	City of Toronto	2015	None	
Tyndall Flood Wall	100m	Peel Region	Mississauga	1991	None	

Table 4

Hazard Potential Classification							
Hazard Potential	Life Safety	Property Losses	Environmental Losses	Cultural Losses			
Low	No Potential Loss of Life	Minimal damage to property with estimated losses not to exceed \$300,000.	Minimal loss of fish and/or wildlife habitat with high capability of natural restoration resulting in a very low likelihood of negatively affecting the status of the population.	Reversible damage to municipally designated cultural heritage sites under the Ontario Heritage Act.			
Moderate	No Potential Loss of Life	Moderate damage with estimated losses not to exceed \$3 million, to agricultural, forestry, mineral aggregate and mining, and petroleum resource operations, other dams or structures not for human habitation, infrastructure and services including local roads and railway lines. The inundation zone is typically undeveloped or predominantly rural or agricultural, or it is managed so that the land usage is for transient activities such as with day-use facilities. Minimal damage to residential, commercial, and industrial areas, or land identified as designated growth areas as shown in official plans.	Moderate loss or deterioration of fish and/or wildlife habitat with moderate capability of natural restoration resulting in a low likelihood of negatively affecting the status of the population.	Irreversible damage to municipal designated cultural heritage sites under the Ontario Heritage Act. Reversible damage to provincially designated cultural heritage sites under the Ontario Heritage Act or nationally recognized heritage sites.			
High	Potential Loss of Life of 1- 10 persons	Appreciable damage with estimated losses not to exceed \$30 million, to agricultural, forestry, mineral aggregate and mining, and petroleum resource operations, other dams or residential,	Appreciable loss of fish and/ or wildlife habitat or significant deterioration of critical fish and/ or wildlife habitat with reasonable likelihood of being able to apply	Irreversible damage to provincially designated cultural heritage sites under the Ontario Heritage Act or damage to			

		commercial, industrial areas,	natural or assisted recovery	nationally recognized heritage
		infrastructure and services, or land	activities to promote species	sites.
		identified as designated growth areas	recovery to viable population	
		as shown in official plans.	levels.	
		Infrastructure and services includes	Loss of a portion of the	
		regional roads, railway lines, or	population of a species classified	
		municipal water and wastewater	under the Ontario Endangered	
		treatment facilities and publicly-owned	Species Act as Extirpated,	
		utilities.	Threatened or Endangered, or	
			reversible damage to the habitat	
			of that species.	
Very High	Potential Loss of Life of 11	Extensive damage, estimated losses in	Extensive loss of fish and/ or	
	or more persons	excess of \$30 million, to buildings,	wildlife habitat or significant	
		agricultural, forestry, mineral aggregate	deterioration of critical fish and/	
		and mining, and petroleum resource	or wildlife habitat with very little	
		operations, infrastructure and services.	or no feasibility of being able to	
		Typically includes destruction of, or	apply natural or assisted	
		extensive damage to, large residential,	recovery activities to promote	
		institutional, concentrated commercial	species recovery to viable	
		and industrial areas and major	population levels.	
		infrastructure and services, or land	Loss of a viable portion of the	
		identified as designated growth areas	population of a species classified	
		as shown in official plans.	under the Ontario Endangered	
		Infrastructure and services include	Species Act as Extirpated,	
		highways, railway lines or municipal	Threatened or Endangered or	
		water and wastewater treatment	irreversible damage to the	
		facilities and publicly-owned utilities.	habitat of that species.	

Notes:

- 1. Incremental losses are those losses resulting from dam failure above those which would occur under the same conditions (flood, earthquake or other event) with the dam in place but without failure of the dam.
- 2. Life safety. Refer to Technical Guide River and Streams Systems: Flooding Hazard Limits, Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2002, for definition of 2 x 2 rule. The 2 x 2 rule defines that people would be at risk if the product of the velocity and the depth exceeded 0.37 square metres per second or if velocity exceeds 1.7 metres per second or if depth of water exceeds 0.8 metres. For dam failures under flood conditions the potential for loss of life is assessed based on permanent dwellings (including habitable buildings and trailer parks) only. For dam failures under normal (sunny day) conditions the potential for loss of life is assessed based on both permanent dwellings (including habitable dwellings, trailer parks and seasonal campgrounds) and transient persons.
- 3. Property losses refer to all direct losses to third parties; they do not include losses to the owner, such as loss of the dam, or revenue. The dollar losses, where identified, are indexed to Statistics Canada values Year 2000.
- 4. An HPC must be developed under both flood and normal (sunny day) conditions.
- 5. Evaluation of the hazard potential is based on both present land use and on anticipated development as outlined in the pertinent official planning documents (e.g. Official Plan). In the absence of an approved Official Plan the HPC should be based on expected development within the foreseeable future. Under the Provincial Policy Statement,

'designated growth areas' means lands within settlement areas designated in an official plan for growth over the long-term planning horizon (specifies normal time horizon of up to 20 years), but which have not yet been fully developed. Designated growth areas include lands which are designated and available for residential growth in accordance with the policy, as well as lands required for employment and other uses (Italicized terms as defined in the PPS, 2005).

- 6. Where several dams are situated along the same watercourse, consideration must be given to the cascade effect of failures when classifying the structures, such that if failure of an upstream dam could contribute to failure of a downstream dam, then the HPC of the upstream dam must be the same as or greater than that of the downstream structure.
- 7. The HPC is determined by the highest potential consequences, whether life safety, property losses, environmental losses, or cultural-built heritage losses.